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Abstract
The 2007–2008 financial crisis has paved the way for the use of macroprudential policies in supervising
the financial system as a whole. This paper views macroprudential oversight in Europe as a process,
a sequence of activities with the ultimate aim of safeguarding financial stability. To conceptualize a
process in this context, we introduce the notion of a public collaborative process (PCP). PCPs involve
multiple organizations with a common objective, where a number of dispersed organizations cooperate
under various unstructured forms and take a collaborative approach to reaching the final goal. We argue
that PCPs can and should essentially be managed using the tools and practices common for business
processes. To this end, we conduct an assessment of process readiness for macroprudential oversight
in Europe. Based upon interviews with key European policymakers and supervisors, we provide an
analysis model to assess the maturity of five process enablers for macroprudential oversight. With the
results of our analysis, we give clear recommendations on the areas that need further attention when
macroprudential oversight is being developed, in addition to providing a general purpose framework
for monitoring the impact of improvement efforts.
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2“ Putting in place this emerging framework for financial stability will be difficult. As we have
seen, it requires new consensus and tools, but it also requires additional resources, better
data, time, and international cooperation to enable us to take timely action.”
– Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS, Washington DC, 23/04/2010
1. Introduction
The current financial crisis has highlighted the importance of a system-wide, or macroprudential,
approach to safeguarding financial stability (e.g., Borio [4]). Rather than being only concerned with the
stability of individual financial institutions, it involves the tasks of preventing and mitigating systemic
risks to avoid widespread financial distress and at the same time also consider economic growth (e.g.,
ESRB Regulation, Article 3(1)). Given these aims, macroprudential oversight can be viewed as a
process, which exhibits inherent complexity. In the case of macroprudential oversight in Europe, the
system of financial supervisors include a large number of actors both at the European and national
level, with a common goal of safeguarding financial stability. With the European System of Financial
Supervisors currently in the making (e.g., EU Commission [16, 17]), now is the time to understand
activities, define responsible entities and discern how the actors interact. Ongoing public and academic
discussion has targeted individual aspects, which oftentimes concern roles of individual institutions,
such as legal challenges (e.g., UK vs. ESMA and Germany vs. banking union), the mandate within
central banks or politicians (Issing [30]), the role of central banks within the ESRB (Goodhart [19]),
ECB as a lender of last resort in the government bond market [9], and a role of E(S)CB in euro area
vs. ESRB in Europe (Schoenmaker [43]). Despite these important discussions, little consideration has
been given to the inner workings and broad underpinnings of macroprudential oversight at large. In
this vein, this paper takes a comprehensive approach to assessing macroprudential oversight in Europe
through a process perspective.
Process management concerns the analysis and improvement of ways of working through systematic
representations of organizations’ processes (e.g., Segatto et al. [45]). This provides means not only for
representing current ways of working, but also for reaching consensus on what form the process should
take and possible areas of improvement (e.g., Hammer [24] and Eikebrokk et al. [14]). Yet, this describes
the functioning and optimization of processes from the viewpoint of a single organization. In the public
sector, processes may be of a different nature. They may involve multiple organizations with a common
objective, where the actors take a collaborative approach to reaching the final goal. We denote these as
public collaborative processes (PCPs). PCPs involve a number of dispersed organizations cooperating
under various unstructured forms. For instance, public health may involve activities ranging from
nutritional health advice to the services of both private and public health care centers and hospitals.
While being of different nature, in this paper we argue that PCPs can and should still be examined
through the lens of process management.
Macroprudential oversight has been described as a process comprising the following high-level tasks
(e.g., ECB [13]): risk identification, risk assessment and risk communication, as well as the assessment
and implementation of policies. While being relatively well-defined at this level, the tasks still in-
volve a number of uncertainties and limitations that challenge the functioning of the process. At a
more detailed level, the process is among other things characterized by a large number of involved
actors, a national and supranational level, an inherent political dimension, vast amounts of data, and
decision-making based upon expert judgment and numerical methods. Further, macroprudential over-
sight exhibits a high degree of dependence between and within tasks as in any process. Given the
aim of process management, in which activities are to be coordinated so that disperse tasks performed
by many different partners act as one seamless process, concerns can be raised about the functioning
of the European macroprudential oversight process (as noted in the first paragraph). Understand-
ing dependence within the tasks becomes particularly crucial when moving towards a more detailed
representation of the process, which is the essence of process management. However, an essential
prerequisite for detailing and documenting a process is a common agreement of the activities at the
focus of attention and the roles of all involved parties, i.e., who is doing what. As a prerequisite
3for process management, this paper examines the maturity of the macroprudential oversight process
through various constructs, such as process design, metrics, and ownership. As such, by identifying
areas of improvement and directing attention at needs, this work lays the foundation for reaching a
more mature process for safeguarding financial stability.
With the aim of assessing the maturity of macroprudential oversight in Europe, this paper conducts
an interview study and builds an analysis model. The study includes interviews with 23 key policy-
makers and supervisors from 12 organizations involved in macroprudential oversight across Europe.
The interviewees were asked a series of questions relating to macroprudential oversight in Europe,
which were mapped to five so-called process enablers (Hammer [23, 24]). The answers were used to
assess the maturity of macroprudential oversight in relation to (i) design, (ii) metrics, (iii) performers,
(iv) infrastructure, and (v) ownership of the process. We provide an analysis model for assessing the
maturity of the five process enablers for macroprudential oversight in Europe, in which we measure
both the level and dissensus in process readiness. This provides a basis to give clear recommendations
regarding the areas that need further attention when developing macroprudential oversight in Europe.
Rather than an ending point, our analysis model also puts forward a structured approach not only to
assess the current state but also to monitor the impact of any improvement efforts. As such, a further
aim of this study is to inspire other assessments with a similar goal in the future.
The paper is structured as follows: first, we briefly discuss macroprudential oversight in light of
currently available material. This is followed by a discussion of business process management, and how
this can be applied in the context of PCPs. In this section, we also examine the differences between
standard processes and PCPs, and show that despite differences a similar approach to formalizing and
improving ways of working is appropriate. In the next section, we discuss our approach to analyzing
data and the results of our analysis of process readiness, and present the areas of improvement needed
for reaching a mature process for safeguarding financial stability. In the conclusion we put forward
an agenda for future research, suggesting how we can move from an analysis of process readiness to
full-blown process management.
2. Macroprudential oversight
Paraphrasing Milton Friedman’s statement about Keynesians, Borio [4] stated “We are all macro-
prudentialists now.”The 2007–2008 financial crisis has paved the way for the macroprudential approach
to safeguarding financial stability, which has now grown consensus among the academic and policymak-
ing communities alike. Yet, it is no new concept. The BIS applied the term to describe a system-wide
orientation of regulatory frameworks already in the 1970s (see, e.g., BIS [3]). The series of recently
established bodies for macroprudential supervision, as well as their effective or planned mandates,
obviously also motivates understanding and disentangling their specific tasks and functions, such as
the European Systemic Risk Board in Europe, the Financial Policy Committee in the UK, and the
Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US.
2.1. Market imperfections and systemic risk
A comprehensive macroprudential approach to safeguarding financial stability obviously starts from
a thorough understanding of the inner functioning, particularly potential dysfunctioning, of the finan-
cial system. While definitions related to financial stability remain to be disputed in the literature, one
notion that few oppose is that a key aim is to have a resilient and well-functioning financial system.
One characterization of such a financial system is through the three pillars proposed by Fell and Schi-
nasi [18]: well-managed financial institutions, efficiently functioning financial markets and a strong
and robust financial infrastructure. That said, the frequent incidences of costly financial crises do,
however, indicate that the three pillars do have defects. While each recurrence of financial instability
may have sources of its own kind, market imperfections like asymmetric and incomplete information,
externalities and public-good characteristics and incomplete markets can be a threat to the functioning
of the financial system. These imperfections, when being related to a financial sector, may lead to
4significant fragility of not only individual institutions, but also the entire system, as noted for instance
by Carletti [5]. While not being directly caused by market imperfections, de Bandt and Hartmann [7]
relate fragilities in financial systems to three causes: (i) the structure of banks, (ii) the interconnection
of financial intermediaries, and (iii) the information intensity of financial contracts. The material risks
of these fragilities support the role of governments and other supervisory authorities in addressing
and monitoring financial instability, which also points to financial stability being a common good and
systemic risk an externality.
Beyond market imperfections, we can concretize the fragility of financial systems through the notion
of systemic risk. Herein, we follow the definition of three forms of systemic risk by de Bandt et al. [8]:
(i) endogenous build-up and unraveling of widespread imbalances; (ii) exogenous aggregate shocks;
and (iii) contagion and spillover. The first form of systemic risk focuses on the unraveling of widespread
imbalances and is illustrated by the presence of risks, vulnerabilities and imbalances in banking systems
and the overall macro-financial environment prior to financial crises. Early and later literature alike
have identified common patterns in underlying vulnerabilities preceding financial crises (e.g., Minsky
[33] and Reinhart and Rogoff [38]). The second type of systemic risk, exogenous aggregate shocks,
have been shown to co-occur with financial instabilities (e.g., Gorton [21] and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache [12]). One example is the collapse of banks during recessions due to the vulnerability to
economic downturns. The contagion literature provides evidence on the final, third form of systemic
risk, which involves the cross-sectional transmission of financial instability (e.g., Upper and Worms
[51] and van Lelyveld and Liedorp [52]). Here, episodes of financial instabilities have been shown to
relate to the failure of one financial intermediary causing the failure of another.
2.2. The macroprudential oversight process
The above described market imperfections, and thereby caused systemic risks, are a premise for
macroprudential oversight. Accordingly, an essential task is the aim of signaling these systemic risks
at an early stage. This necessitates access to a broad toolbox of approaches to measure and analyze
system-wide threats to financial stability. Broadly speaking, tools and models can be divided into
those for early identification and assessment of systemic risks. ECB [13] provides a mapping of tools
to the above listed three forms of systemic risk: (i) early-warning indicators and models, (ii) macro
stress-testing models, and (iii) contagion models. First, by focusing on the presence of vulnerabilities
and imbalances in an economy, early-warning models can be used to derive probabilities of being
in a vulnerable state, in which a shock descending from any source may trigger a systemic financial
crises (e.g., Alessi and Detken [2] and Lo Duca and Peltonen [32]). Second, macro stress-testing models
provide means to assess the resilience of the financial system to a wide variety of aggregate shocks, such
as economic downturns (e.g., Castre´n et al. [6] and Hirtle et al. [26]). Third, contagion and spillover
models can be employed to assess how resilient the financial system is to cross-sectional transmission
of financial instability (e.g., IMF [28]). In addition, the literature has also provided a large set of
coincident indicators to measure the contemporaneous level of systemic risk (e.g., Hollo´ et al. [27]).
While coincident measures may be used to identify, signal and report on heightened stress, they are
not designed for early identification and assessment of risk.
Despite the importance of analysis, in which risk identification and assessment is in focus, the most
central part of macroprudential oversight relates to policy interventions. In terms of a process, Figure
1 puts forward the steps in the process that a macroprudential supervisory body follows. As described
by ECB [13], macroprudential oversight can be related to three steps: (i) risk identification, (ii) risk as-
sessment, and (iii) risk communication, policy assessment, risk warnings and policy recommendations
and implementation. The process in Figure 1 deviates from ECB [13] by disentangling the final step
into two separate feedback loops, as proposed by Sarlin [39]. In the figure, red components represent
risks and vulnerabilities, green components represent the need for risk identification and assessment,
gray components represent policy assessment, risk warnings, policy recommendations and policy im-
plementations, and blue components represent risk communication. With no detailed treatment, we
present herein the key tasks and tools used in each step.
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Notes: The figure illustrates the macroprudential oversight process. The red components represent risks and vulnerabilities and
the green components represent the need for risk identification and assessment, gray components represent policy assessment,
risk warnings, policy recommendations and policy implementations, and blue components represent risk communication. The
figure is an adapted version of that in ECB [13] and Sarlin [39].
Figure 1: The macroprudential oversight process
In the first step of the supervisory process, the key focus is on identifying risks to stability and
potential sources of vulnerability. The vulnerabilities and risks could exist in any of the three pillars
of the financial system: financial intermediaries, financial markets and financial infrastructure. The
necessary analytical tools to identify possible risks, vulnerabilities and triggers come from the set
of early-warning models and indicators, combined with the use of market intelligence, and expert
judgment and experience. This involves ranking risks and vulnerabilities as per intensity, as well as
for assigning probabilities to specific shocks or future systemic events.
In the second step of the process, the rankings and probabilities may be used to assess the identified
risks. Beyond market intelligence, as well as expert judgment and experience, risk assessment makes
use of analytical tools mainly from the set of macro stress-testing models and contagion models. In
macro stress-testing, simulations of most plausible risk scenarios show the degree of impact severity
on the overall financial system, as well as its components. Contagion models, on the other hand,
might be used through counterfactual simulations to assess the impact of specific failures on the entire
financial system and individual institutions. The first and the second step of the process should not
only provide a list of risks ordered according to possible severity, but also contain their materialization
probabilities, losses given their materialization, and real losses in output and welfare, as well as their
possible systemic impact. Hence, these two initial steps in the process aim at early risk identification
and assessment and steer subsequent actions for safeguarding financial stability.
The third step of the process involves the assessment, recommendation and implementation of
policy actions as early preventive measures, as well as the communication of risks and vulnerabilities.
Based upon the identified and assessed risks, a macroprudential supervisory body can consider giving a
wide variety of risk warnings and recommendations for other parties to use policy instruments, as well
as implementations of policies given the instruments at hand. With no detailed discussion of policies,
the most prominent tools to steer system-wide risks include countercyclical capital buffers (CCBs),
and loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income caps, among many other discussed policy tools. To steer
their decisions, the policy assessment step can make use of the same analytical tools used for risk iden-
tification and assessment. Likewise, risk warnings and policy recommendations can make use of the
analytical tools. While the use of policy tools may be beyond the mandate of some macroprudential
supervisory bodies, actions tailored to the needs of a system-wide orientation are obviously a key part
6of macroprudential regulation and supervision. As illustrated in Figure 1, policies and their recom-
mendations have an impact, not only on the assessment of policy and identification and assessment of
risks, but obviously also directly on market imperfections and the accumulation of systemic risks. The
feedback of risk communication can, likewise, be divided into those that affect the risk identification
and assessment and those affecting the financial market at large, where the former can be targeted
with internal communication and the latter with external communication. Moreover, the information
to be communicated might derive from the risk identification and assessment steps, as well as from the
other tasks in step three.
2.3. European System of Financial Supervisors
The European transition towards a common framework for macroprudential oversight can be moti-
vated with goal of reaching financial stability in an environment of cross-border finance. Accordingly,
paraphrasing the classic trilemma of monetary policy, the financial trilemma questions the possibility
of simultaneous (i) financial stability, (ii) financial integration and (iii) national financial policies.
As proposed already by Thygesen [49] and Schoenmaker [40], and formalized in Schoenmaker [41],
one of the three objectives has to give. In a world of increasing financial and economic integration,
this indicates that the task of producing the public good of financial stability ought to also involve a
supranational level, as proposed by De Larosie`re [10].
To understand the set-up of macroprudential oversight in the European case, we need to focus
on the entire system of financial supervisors. In this section, we briefly discuss the actors and their
roles in the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). Without including strictly political
institutions, the actors involved in safeguarding financial stability are the following: European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), national central banks (NCBs), European
Commission (EC), European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance & Occupational Pensions
Authority (EIOPA), European Securities & Market Authority (ESMA), and national banking, insur-
ance and securities supervisors. While their common aim is safeguarding financial stability at various
levels, it is needless to say that disentangling activities and functions, as well as their connectors, at
the level of responsible entities substantially increases complexity.
Following the description by the European Commission [16, 17], as well as the illustration by Hart-
mann [25], we can move towards an understanding of the overall division of aims and focus areas.
First, Figure 2 shows that supervision is divided into microprudential and macroprudential super-
visory bodies. Second, within each of these two branches, the actors consist of both national and
European institutions. Third, there exists a large share of interaction and collaboration both between
and within these two groups of supervisors. For instance, while microprudential supervisory bodies do
not have macroprudential oversight as their key aim, they are oftentimes the ones implementing policies
according to recommendations by macroprudential supervisory bodies. Likewise, microprudential in-
formation is an important input to analysis of system-wide risks by macroprudential supervisors. Yet,
while we herein illustrate the complexity of macroprudential oversight in Europe, we do not provide a
detailed description of tasks, interaction and collaboration.
Moving beyond the stylized representation in Figure 2, we should not forget that institutional
models in Europe significantly vary among countries. Following the 2012 ESRB recommendation
(ref. ESRB/2011/3) and the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR, Regulation No. 575/2013),
European Union member states were required to set up a designated authority for macroprudential su-
pervision. In addition to political and legal heterogeneity across countries, the organizations mandated
with macroprudential oversight include Ministries of Finance, central banks, financial supervisory au-
thority (FSA) and joint committees of all above. As is shown in Table 1, which is based upon ESRB
IWG WP/2013/011 and Schoenmaker [44], the central bank is mostly tasked with macroprudential
oversight, yet not at all always.1 Despite several central banks are mandated with tasks in both mon-
etary policy and financial supervision, they oftentimes separate micro- and macroprudential tasks into
1See ESRB [15] for a breakdown at the country level.
7separate departments, whereas some FSAs are alone mandated with macroprudential policy. This
points also to another dimension of complexity in the ESFS: multiple policy goals.
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Notes: The figure describes the structure of the ESFS depicted by the EU Commission [16, 17]. It is adapted from a version
in Hartmann [25].
Figure 2: The European System of Financial Supervisors
Table 1: ESFS’s institutional models for macroprudential oversight
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Agency Ministry of Finance Central bank FSA Committee
Euro area 0 (0%) 11 (58%) 4 (21%) 4 (21%)
Non-euro area 1 (10%) 6 (60%) 1 (10%) 2 (20%)
Total 1 (3%) 17 (59%) 5 (17%) 6 (21%)
Notes: The figure describes the institutional models in ESFS as reported in reported in ESRB IWG WP/2013/011 and Schoen-
maker [44]. A country breakdown can be found in ESRB [15].
Moving from financial stability to other policy objectives highlights the fact that we should not
consider one sole process separately but rather in conjunction with other tasks of the actors in the
ESFS. In the vein of Tinbergen’s [50] analysis, each policy objective ought to be mapped to a policy
instrument, and ideally each objective has one independent instrument. Following the analysis by
Schoenmaker [42], Table 2 shows the potential for synergies and/or conflicts among policy objectives,
when considering monetary, macroprudential and microprudential policies, objectives and goals to-
gether. While each policy has a direct impact on its own objective, they have a secondary impact
on the neighboring objectives, which all might take the form of synergies and conflicts. Even though
fulfillment of one policy goal may support the fulfillment of another, the roads to them may involve
conflicts. Without weighting synergies vis-a`-vis conflicts, this still highlights the fact that no one task
can be considered in isolation of others. In fact, this highlights the existence of three separate, yet
interacting, processes, which all ought to be managed given their ultimate goals.
8Table 2: Synergies and conflicts between policy objectives
Policy (typical instruments) Objective Ultimate goal (impact level)
Monetary policy →
Price stability
(short-term interest rate) ↘ ↘ Stable and non-inflationary
Macroprudential ↗ ↗ growth (economic system)
(LTVs, CCBs) → Financial stability
↘
Microprudential ↗ Soundness of individual → Protection of consumers
(LTVs, capital ratios) → financial institutions (individual institutions)
Notes: The figure describes the institutional models in ESFS as reported in reported in ESRB IWG WP/2013/011. A country
breakdown can be found in ESRB [15].
3. Process management
This section discusses process management as it is applied in our context. With a focus on assessing
process readiness, we particularly describe the analysis of public collaborative processes.
3.1. Business process management
Broadly speaking, an organizational process can be defined as a chain of activities that make use
of an input to produce an output. This implies that any organization, public or private, has processes.
The raison d’eˆtre for documenting and understanding organizational processes on the other hand goes
back to performance. This can imply that there is a desire for improvement, or a desire to overcome
shortcomings in performance. Absent any common understanding of a process, it becomes difficult
or impossible to meet or exceed any performance targets. While a common understanding of how a
process works (and how the activities therein interact) can be implicitly understood by those working
on the task at hand, more complex processes that span across organizational entities create a need for
more formalized communication.
The roots of quality control and process improvement date back to the seminal book published in
1911 by Taylor [48], which has hitherto influenced many in the process movement. Aiming at process
performance improvement, business process management (BPM) descends from two antecedent fields:
statistical process control (Deming [11]) and business process reengineering (Hammer [22]). BPM as
a field of study takes a holistic approach to managing an organization’s processes. Segatto et al. [45]
define BPM as a discipline focusing on gaining a common understanding of processes with the aim of
continuously seeking improvement through a feedback cycle, while at the same time also aligning these
processes to organizational strategies. They divide BPM to six distinct phases (adapted from ABPMP
[1]):
1. Planning : In this initial stage, executive sponsors, roles and responsibilities, goals and overall
purpose of the BPM exercise are determined.
2. Analysis: This involves understanding of the current state of organizational processes.
3. Design and modeling : At this stage, a more detailed representation of as-is and/or to-be processes
are created. Essentially, this phase focuses on gaining answers to questions such as what is done,
by whom, when, how, and in which organizational entity. This is also referred to as process
modeling, whereby an external representation of the process is documented as a process model (
Eikebrokk et al. [14]).
4. Implementation: Here, activities in the organization are, if necessary, adapted to findings from
previous stages.
5. Monitoring and control : Here, performance metrics are analyzed to see whether these give raise
to further changes in the organization.
96. Refinement : After an analysis of process performance, further work in the analysis and design
phases of the BPM cycle might be necessary.
In the context of these six stages, the assessment of process readiness conducted in this paper falls
into the second stage. Despite this, we hope that the ideas and thoughts brought forward in this
paper could lead to a more formalized approach to improving macroprudential oversight (stage one:
planning). Likewise, we have not made an attempt at improving design and modeling (stage three),
as we are not presenting a detailed documentation of the process using a standard annotation for
representing all the activities therein. With this study, our focus is thus on establishing whether
there is a common understanding of the process, explicit or implicit, among the European System of
Financial Supervisors, and on identifying potential bottlenecks in the underlying enablers of a mature
process.
3.2. Process Readiness
Process analysis, as one of the six distinct phases of BPM, aims at understanding current states of
organizational processes. Given the common complexity of today’s processes, analysis invokes struc-
tured approaches to gain a better understanding of the inner workings of processes and their associated
performance targets. One widely known structured approach to understanding the state of a process
is the assessment of process readiness or maturity, as introduced by Hammer [23, 24].
To define a mature, high-performance process, one can assess process-specific characteristics.Hammer
[23] defines five critical enablers for well-functioning processes: (i) process design, (ii) process metrics,
(iii) process performers, (iv) process infrastructure, and (v) process owners. The design of the process
goes back to the specification of what tasks are to be performed, by whom, and what the associated
inputs and outputs are. This also involves an understanding of the organization(s) involved and how
the activities interact to produce a desired outcome. The metrics of the process detail the desired
outcome in more specific terms. Performance needs to be monitored against targets such as speed or
quality. With process design and metrics at hand, process performance can be simulated (in relation
to, for example, time, cost, and resources needed), allowing for a better understanding of potential
improvement areas. This approach has been taken in many different contexts, such as hospitals and
banks [29, 46]. The performers of the process are those that perform the process activities. The persons
involved should not only be well versed in their particular activity or part of the process, but also be
aware of the end-to-end design and metrics of the whole process. A suitable infrastructure also needs
to be in place for the process performers to be able to conduct their work. Typically, this involves IT
systems with the appropriate access to information they need in order to accomplish their task. For
instance, a process improvement effort at a Swiss bank revealed many improvement areas that were
specifically related to the IT systems that were used to support the process (Ku¨ng and Hagen [31]).
Last but not least, a process owner is to be nominated. This is an executive level person or organization
that has the authority to oversee the process as a whole. Without a process owner, improvements and
changes that span across different involved organizations becomes difficult or impossible.
The primary aim with this study is to conduct an assessment of process readiness according to the
enablers outlined above. For this purpose, we rely on a more detailed break-down of the five process
enablers, adapted from Hammer [23]. We have designed a set of questions to assess the maturity of
each of the five enablers with their sub-categories (all detailed in Section 4.2). Through the assessment
of process readiness, we can identify areas of improvement and set the basis for a functioning process,
also creating the basis for full-fledged process management, if so desired. Yet, we acknowledge that
the nature of processes in macroprudential oversight, as well as some processes in the public sector
at large, is somewhat different to a standard business process. Can these be studied with tools from
BPM?
3.3. Public collaborative processes
Beyond profit-maximizing businesses, societies are organized around public goals regarding the well-
being of their citizens. As noted by Olson [34], among many others, the need for public involvement is
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mostly related to markets with positive and negative externalities and characteristics of non-excludable
and non-rivalrous goods and services, as well as fundamental human rights.2 In addition to involvement
only in minor market segments, we define a public goal as a broader ultimate objective provided by
the government to the population within its jurisdiction, which might require involvement of a set of
public, private and third sector actors.
Comprising of multiple providers acting together for a common purpose, the actors involved in
public goals are oftentimes dispersed. Examples of these societal goals include public safety, education
and health, as well as a well-functioning financial system. Oftentimes, we also see actors taking on
roles that are typically not associated with their primary goal. One such example could be schools
educating children in traffic rules and fire hazards, and thus promoting public safety. The police
might be offering lectures on drug abuse, and thus promoting public health. Thus, public institutions
work together to build a well-functioning society, oftentimes taking on different roles depending on an
individual’s particular needs. Sickness, criminal behavior, age, disabilities, and personal interests are all
relevant examples of conditions that can trigger a particular response from society. In some instances,
the response is highly regulated and clearly defined, such as in the case of criminal misconduct, but
oftentimes there is a high degree of informal co-operation and implicit understanding of how to promote
a particular goal. The case of public health is such an example. If we disregard the most obvious
example of an actor in this field, hospitals, which are usually involved when a de facto health problem
already exists, we see a host of actors involved in preventive measures to avoid health issues. This is
highly dependent on specific structures in various countries, but it is not uncommon to see a diverse set
of actors in fields like education, food safety, and sports promoting health, in addition to the explicit
healthcare system. As such, many different actors are then involved in the process of ensuring public
health.
We denote the activities performed by various societal actors working together for a common
purpose as a public collaborative process (PCP). This is defined as a set of public, private, and
third sector actors, working together in a collaborative manner for a societal goal, which is defined
and possibly regulated at a governmental level. The complexity of these types of processes becomes
apparent when one moves from a high-level description to a lower level, where responsibilities and
activities performed by individual organizations are disentangled. The high-level goals for PCPs are
typically explicitly documented, and there is often a primary organizational entity that assumes the
overall responsibility for the process. However, at a lower level, the activities and cooperation performed
by a dispersed set of actors are oftentimes more unstructured in nature, such as following less formal
documentation and being more dependent on bilateral agreements. Mostly, these activities are also
coordinated at a high level, such as by a responsible ministry, potentially creating a gap between the
operative and governing actors.
Macroprudential oversight is clearly a PCP. To begin with, its goal of financial stability can be seen
as a public good in that the producer cannot exclude anybody from consuming it (i.e., non-excludable)
and consumption by one does not impact that of others (i.e., non-rivalness). Further, it involves
collaboration of a large number of dispersed actors to reach the common goal, and their cooperation is
fairly unstructured. A crucial question to ask is whether PCPs, including macroprudential oversight,
can and should be managed with the same means as business processes. We believe they should, since
they contain the same elements. The basic function of any process is to transform inputs to outputs
with the ultimate goal of serving customers. This could take on the form of delivering a product or
a service, ensuring that a curriculum is taught and understood, ensuring that a particular illness is
prevented or treated, or ensuring that financial stability is safeguarded to enable a well-functioning
financial system. This basic and fundamental element is common for both business processes and
PCPs. The justification of any process, public or private, is that it serves its ultimate customers.
There are, however, differences between business processes and PCPs, specifically in how processes
2For a further discussion on theories of economic regulation, readers are directed to the seminal papers by Stigler [47]
and Posner [37], as well as a later review by Peltzman [35].
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Notes: The figure represents a comparison of PCPs and standard business processes. While business processes are shown to
target chosen, individual customer segments, PCPs serve entire populations. Likewise, the figure shows that the feedback loop
of PCPs through elected officials is complex in nature, whereas in standard business processes customers choose whom to buy
from.
Figure 3: Public collaborative processes and business processes
are adapted to serve customers. Figure 3 illustrates two challenges: indirect and complex feedback
loops. A crucial element in firm competitiveness is adaptability to customer needs (e.g., Porter [36]).
With the same token, any PCP should ultimately be adapted to serve its customers, the citizens
of any given country. However, the feedback loop between the provider and the customer differs
substantially when comparing PCPs to business processes. While the firm typically has a rather direct
link to their customers, the same cannot be said of PCPs. Instead, any fundamental change to the
structure, performers, and function of PCPs is regulated through an oftentimes democratic system, with
politicians serving as the representative of the customer, the people. Accordingly, another dimension
of complexity derives from the fact that PCPs need not only serve a target group of customers, but
rather the population in its entirety.
Despite these challenges may explain the characteristics of PCPs, such as a dispersed set of actors
cooperating under unstructured forms, we see no reason why PCPs would not be examined through
the means of process management. Accordingly, the lengthy and complex feedback loop in PCPs does
not reduce the need to formalize processes. Beyond a more efficient and effective PCP, low process
readiness only serves to create confusion, whereas well-documented and understood PCPs serve to
direct the attention of both voters and elected officials to matters of importance.
4. Assessing the maturity of macroprudential oversight in Europe
This section presents the overall research design, including approaches for data collection and
methodological perspectives, the analysis model used as a basis for drawing conclusions of the data,
and discussion and analysis of the collected data with the help of the model.
4.1. Research design
For the purposes of this study, we have conducted a series of interviews involving actors that
operate within the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). Initially, we started out by
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conducting four semi-structured interviews. The aim with these interviews was to assess a suitable
level of analysis, that is, how should we go about looking at macroprudential oversight with the lens of
process management. Our interpretation of the semi-structured interviews was that macroprudential
oversight is not mature enough for full process management. Although there was an agreement of
the aim to effectively and efficiently safeguard financial stability, process design and modeling (with
subsequent steps in the six BPM phases) seemed elusive at this stage. Hence, we decided to approach
process management from a more elementary perspective by assessing process readiness.
We continued data gathering through interviews. At this stage, we opted for a more structured
approach with pre-defined questions that relate directly to the five process enablers. The questions
are detailed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In total, we conducted 23 additional interviews, of which
four are written answers from the four interviewees of the semi-structured interviews. This involved a
total of 12 organizations within the ESFS. The interviews lasted around 75 minutes each, except for
the four written accounts with answers to the same questions. All of the interviews were conducted
within May and June, 2014.
Our aim was to have a broad coverage of the organizations depicted in Figure 2. This involves
covering both national and European organizations, and policymakers and supervisors, as well as
actors within and outside central banks, and with and without a direct macroprudential mandate. In an
effort to avoid elite bias (involving only managerial viewpoints), we wanted to ensure not only a broad
organizational coverage, but also insights to the opinions of people on all levels within the involved
organizations. Generally, we aimed at approaching two experts within each involved organization,
out of which one was an operative expert and one a governing expert, both from financial stability
functions. Governing experts refer to policymakers and supervisors involved in heading or managing a
division or department with financial stability responsibility, whereas operative experts refer to analysts
and economists involved in data management and analysis in a similar division.
In Figure 4, we present statistics of the interviewee sample’s characteristics. Out of 23 interviewees,
12 were classified as governing and 13 as operative experts. The sum does not add up as expertise
is not mutually exclusive. Due to the small size of their organization, particularly departments fo-
cusing on macroprudential tasks, two interviewees were assessed to be in charge of both governing
and operative tasks. In a mutually exclusive classification of interviewee’s roles, our sample consists
of 14 policymakers and 9 supervisors. The division into policymakers and supervisors follows to a
large extent the division between microprudential and macroprudential organizations, with exceptions
due to variation in institutional models. For instance, supervisory authorities may be mandated with
macroprudential tasks or may be located within the central bank. Hence, we also report that 17 of our
interviewees are in an organization with a macroprudential mandate and the same number are located
within a central bank. Distinguishing between national and supranational organizations, our sample
consists of 10 interviewees at a European level and 13 at a national level.
To promote an open discussion, we give interviewees full anonymity. Furthermore, due to the
sensitive nature of the topic, we also made a decision not to record the interviews. With these measures,
we feel that there were few inhibitions with regard to our interviewees expressing their true opinion.
During the interviews, a brief summary of each answer was written down as the interview progressed.
For our data analysis, we relied on this written documentation to obtain an overview of the opinions
of our interviewees. Each answer was given a score between 1 and 5, one representing a low readiness
with regard to the process enabler being measured, and five representing a high readiness. The scores
were given based on a joint discussion between the two authors of this paper. In Table A.2 in the
Appendix, we provide guidance on our scaling through examples of given scores. Furthermore, for
each measured process enabler and its subdimensions, we also aim at obtaining a measure of consensus
between our interviewees through the variation in scores given by us.
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Notes: This bar chart shows statistics of the interviewee sample’s characteristics. For each property, a bar shows the number
of individual respondents that fulfill that specific characteristic.
Figure 4: Characteristics of the interviewees
4.2. The analysis model
This section presents the analysis model used to assess the macroprudential oversight process. First,
we describe how we mapped the interview questions to the process enablers discussed in Section 3.2.
Then, we provide a framework for assessing process maturity of macroprudential oversight, in which
we measure both the level and dissensus in process readiness. Figure 5 presents the analysis model
that we put forward herein.
Following the set-up in Section 3.2, we describe process readiness through the five process enablers:
process performers, design, metrics, infrastructure and owner. In order to fit this framework to the
process of macroprudential oversight in Europe, we customized our interview questions to the process
enablers. The questions aim at capturing the level of readiness for each enabler; compared to Ham-
mer’s [23] original framework we have reformulated the questions to fit the domain in question. At
the beginning of each interview, we stressed that we wish to have a European focus throughout the
conversation. While the precise formulation of the questions can be found in Table A.1 and the scaling
of our scores in A.2, both in the Appendix, the below discussion focuses on the enablers and their
subdimensions that we aim at measuring.
• First, we assess process performers through the skillset and mindset of involved actors. Knowledge
is assessed through familiarity with macroprudential oversight, including both issues related to
policy and decisionmaking, and analysis and assessment of financial stability. Behavior focuses
on intrinsic motivation and true interest in improving and developing macroprudential oversight.
• Second, the assessment of process design focuses mainly on a step-by-step specification, or end-
to-end design, of macroprudential oversight. This is disentangled into three subdimensions: (i)
purpose, a clear end-to-end understanding of macroprudential oversight; (ii) context, an aware-
ness of inputs and outputs among institutions; and (iii) documentation, a clear and accessible
specification of tasks to be performed.
• Third, we assess process metrics through the overall use of measurement in steering macro-
prudential oversight as a process. This mainly concerns the definitions and uses of metrics to
ensure efficiency and effectiveness and a balance between costs and benefits in macroprudential
oversight, but also involves the use of analytics in measuring systemic risk.
• Fourth, we assess the extent to which tools and human resources provide a sufficient infrastructure
for supporting tasks in macroprudential oversight. Tools refers broadly to infrastructure provided
by available policy interventions and IT and data-related support functions. Human resources
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as an infrastructure focuses on the sufficiency of hiring, training and development as a support
for macroprudential functions.
• Fifth, the assessment of process owners focuses on responsibilities and mandates to oversee
macroprudential oversight. More specifically, we are concerned with the responsible entity for
well-functioning macroprudential oversight, for guiding development activities and with ultimate
mandate to implement changes.
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Notes: The figure presents the analysis model that is put forward in this paper. For each measured process enabler (and its
subdimensions), we represent two measures: level and dissensus of readiness. Level of readiness is represented through positions
of a marker along the horizontal dimension, whereas dissensus is shown through the size of the rectangular marker.
Figure 5: The analysis model
We view these five process enablers through an analysis model that measures the level of readiness
and lack of consensus (or dissensus) for each enabler. Beyond quantifying individual interviewees’
responses into a scale between 1 and 5 for each process enabler, as well as their subdimensions, we also
measure the level of readiness and dissensus through quantitative means. The level of readiness L is
computed through a simple arithmetic mean of the observed values a1, a2, ..., an:
L =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ai
where N stands for the size of the sample. The dissensus in readiness D of an enabler is measured
through the standard uncorrected sample standard deviation:
D =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(ai − L)2
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where a1, a2, ..., an are again the observed values and L is the mean value of the observations. We
maintain that a low consensus, representing inconsistency in the scoring of a given process enabler, is
indicative of an unclear overall status, thus lowering the readiness for that enable. In Figure 5, each
process enabler is broken down into a number of subdimensions, for which the level of readiness is
represented with the position of a rectangular marker on the horizontal axis (higher readiness to the
right) and dissensus as the size of the rectangle.
When mapping the questions to the level of readiness, it should be noted that for some questions the
explicit answer is less interesting than the ability to provide an answer in the first place. Such is the case,
for example, when we inquire about improvement possibilities to macroprudential oversight. We view
clear improvement suggestions as a strong willingness to improve the process, and are less interested
in the actual improvement proposal, albeit also important in itself. Moreover, when capturing lack of
consensus (or dissensus) in terms of variation in the assessed readiness levels, it is also worth noting
that the measure as such is not always reflecting actual dissensus. For instance, despite the interviewees
agree upon the existence of process owners, and can name them, it does not reflect the fact that they
disagree on the identity of the actual owner.
4.3. Discussion
With the above presented research and analysis model as a basis, this section discusses the results
of our empirical analysis. Measuring the level of and dissensus in process readiness in our sample
allows us to assess the maturity of macroprudential oversight in Europe. We present the results in
Figure 6. Broadly, our analysis shows the following observations. To start with, we observe that
‘process design’ (including purpose, context, and documentation) and ‘process metrics’ (particularly
definitions and use of metrics) exhibit the lowest levels of readiness. The level of consensus is high,
or in other words, there seems to be an agreement with regard to the challenges in this area. The
‘process performers’ enabler exhibits a relatively high level of readiness but with some disagreement
in comparison to design. Analytics to steer process metrics, as well as the ‘process infrastructure’
and ‘process ownership’ enablers, exhibit an average level of readiness, but with larger dissensus.
In particular, despite agreement on the existence of a process owner, the lack of consensus on the
ownership is especially alarming due to the range of suggestions. Beyond these numerical aggregates,
but with them as a starting point, we also tap into the richness of the underlying interview data in the
following.
The performers as a process enabler is generally seen as sufficient. Overall, our respondents are
familiar with the current setting in macroprudential oversight, in particular from the perspective of their
own task, but also from an end-to-end perspective. Most interviewees can name the involved actors.
Yet, it is clear, and also obvious, that the ongoing development of macroprudential oversight causes
uncertainty due to the lack of visibility to the future. It is also worth noting that our interpretation
of questions related to this enabler is indirect in nature, as to minimize a potential sampling bias due
to all interviewees’ having a financial stability responsibility. There are certain discrepancies in the
answers to the questions related to the behavior of performers. While this can partly be explained by
different roles and responsibilities (national vs. European level and hierarchical position), there are
some who show a degree of cynicism as to their opportunities to influence and the overall chance of
reaching well-functioning macroprudential oversight. As above, the lack of clear insight to the future
might have introduced a bias, lowering the perception of the overall willingness to improve the process
at a European level.
At a general level, we can clearly observe a lack of readiness in process design. Given the risk of
over-emphasizing the political and legislative context in which macroprudential oversight operates, we
designed the questions to have a focus on the internal process (i.e., the tasks as described in Figure 1).
Despite this, the discussion often revolved around legal and political challenges. These aspects include
challenges when moving between the national and European level, challenges that are further accentu-
ated when moving outside states in the euro area. Overall, a great deal of confusion exists regarding
who is responsible for different parts of macroprudential oversight. From a context perspective, discus-
sions have highlighted more conflicts between various processes (i.e., policy objectives) than synergies.
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Further, no documented end-to-end process exists. Many interviewees referred to legislation, although
these are not directly comparable to work descriptions. National level seems to be better documented
and more easily accessible than European level.
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Notes: The figure presents an assessment of the process of macroprudential oversight in Europe. Level of readiness is represented
through positions of a marker along the horizontal dimension, whereas dissensus is shown through the size of the rectangular
marker. The figure represents on the left an aggregate result and on the right a result disaggregated for respondents in national
and European institutions, respectively.
Figure 6: Assessing the process of macroprudential oversight in Europe
In terms of process metrics, despite wide agreement on the need for them, there are currently
no measures of well-functioning macroprudential oversight. In certain cases, references were made
to measures of systemic risk, even though there is agreement that they are not the same as well-
functioning macroprudential oversight. As a consequence, it is impossible to say whether costs and
benefits of macroprudential oversight is aligned, something that some interviewees pointed out would
be crucial in gaining customer justification (i.e., acceptance from the public). Analytical models do
play a key role in macroprudential oversight, which is agreed upon by almost all interviewees. Despite
wide agreement on the use of analytics, the interviewees agree equally much upon the fact that systemic
risk is challenging to quantitatively measure. Even with the right metrics in place, measurability and
the changing nature of risk have been highlighted as issues, such as concerns with shadow banking.
Infrastructure for macroprudential oversight is generally seen as work in progress; there seems
to be agreement on differences in readiness. Policy instruments and tools are available, although
possibly still requiring development and amendments in legislation to allow for implementation of
suitable measures. IT infrastructure seems to be sufficient but to the contrary, there seems to be wide
agreement on needed improvements to the overall data infrastructure, particularly dealing with big
data, European-level databases, data quality checks, cross-sectional comparability and linking various
sources. One general challenge seems to be related to data sharing, ranging from turf issues to legal
issues and lags in making it available. There is consensus on a sufficient overall human resources
infrastructure, which supports in hiring of employees. However, interviewees voiced concerns related
to the availability of people who have knowledge and know-how of macroprudential oversight. As
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the field is new, there is a lack of people with the necessary skills that would directly support the
tasks at hand. This also created a large discrepancy in the answers, and an increase in dissensus,
depending on the focus of the respondent. According to some, but not all, training and development
of existing resources is available, to the extent that time permits. In our view, the level of existing
training depends also on the maturity of other process enablers, such as end-to-end design, measures
of financial stability and analytics.
Regarding ownership, many respondents mentioned one or more responsible entities as being in
charge of well-functioning macroprudential oversight (including the development of the process, and
overseeing tasks and performers). At the same time, many interviewees acknowledged challenges in
this area, clearly indicating that they do not know who is in charge. Furthermore, the range of actors
mentioned by those that were willing to point at the entity or entities in charge was very broad.3
It would seem many organizations are involved but no one is having the overall responsibility for
the process. Our approach to scoring indicated fairly low dissensus, but this does not capture the
differences in the named responsible actors. As such, there is little consensus on individual process
owners.
Beyond the level of and dissensus in readiness for individual process enablers, one should not forget
that the enablers are mutually interdependent. In case any one enabler is missing or insufficient, the
rest of the enablers are prone to be ineffective. Hammer [23] exemplifies interdependence as follows:
“A weak owner can’t implement a strong process design, poorly trained performers can’t carry out the
design, a bad design can’t optimize the process metrics [...].” In the context under analysis, we can
observe a number of interdependency-linked challenges related to the enablers with lowest readiness:
process design, metrics and ownership. Starting out from improvements to the process design, one
would need other process enablers to guide and implement changes. While process metrics ought to
provide guidance on bottlenecks in the process design, the ultimate implementation of changes is to be
carried through by the process owner. These can be seen as clear hinders to process design improve-
ments. Likewise, as the definitions and uses of metrics show the lowest readiness, and respondents
struggle in defining systemic risk, it is neither clear nor convincing that systemic risk analytics can be
carried out effectively, despite its average readiness. In addition, we have observed that weaknesses
in process enablers may also derive from others enablers, such as challenges in data infrastructure
(process metrics) being a process design problem related to data sharing.
In addition to the five process enablers, the interviewees were asked a final question on the key
challenge and how they would improve macroprudential oversight in Europe.4 The aim of the question
was to highlight the most significant challenges and to enable a discussion of issues outside the scope
of previous questions. In the following, we will describe a summary of the discussed issues. The most
prominent challenge related to the lack of clear mandates and responsibilities, and the complexity of
the system of involved actors. A number of respondents highlighted many overlapping layers in actors’
tasks and the need to streamline procedures, structures and the overall design of the process. In this
context, many also highlighted problems with data availability and sharing, again pointing to these
issues being a design problem. Relating to metrics, respondents also requested further research and
guidance on the following issues: definitions of systemic risk, how financial instability happens and
the link between policy objectives and tools. Moreover, interviewees also pointed out that we are in
the beginning of macroprudential oversight in Europe, and that time will show and guide us in how
things ought to develop. In fact, interviewees even hinted value in the type of assessment proposed
3To exemplify the wide range of the mentioned involved actors, the interviewees named the following bodies or persons:
ESRB, FSC, FSB, European Council, Heads of State, ECB, ECB’s Governing Council, Mario Draghi, ESFS, European
Commission, Voting citizens, European Parliament, SSM (as of Nov 2014), ESRB’s General Board, national authorities
including central banks (jointly and individually mentioned by respondents), Ministries of Finance, Eurogroup Working
Group, ECOFIN, “those responsible for policy implementation” and “ECB for euro area and ESRB for Europe”, as well
as “no one and all”.
4The wording of the question was as follows: “Forget all restrictions: How should macroprudential oversight in Europe
be improved? What would it take for this to happen?”
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and conducted in this paper.
A final view to the analysis model descends from various aggregations. Instead of considering all
respondents, we can choose to focus on subsets based upon their roles (see Figure 4). The respondents
may be categorized based upon institutional models (see Figure 2) and policy mandates (see Figure 3),
as well as differences in the profiles of actors (see Goodhart et al. [20] for a comparison of policymakers
and supervisors). This not only provides insights into process readiness, but can also be seen as a type
of robustness check with respect to the sampling of respondents. The left column in Figure 6 provides
results disaggregated with respect to respondents from national and European institutions. Generally,
we can observe that the results are similar in nature. When assessing the largest differences, we can
observe that European actors perceive themselves to be more knowledgeable about macroprudential
oversight and assess the documentation to be of better quality. This is most likely in line with the fact
that actors at the European level are in a position to have better (and potentially earlier) insights into
European macroprudential oversight, and might thus also be better aware of the prevailing documen-
tation. The lower level of readiness in IT infrastructure might not only point to challenges in these
issues in European organizations, but might potentially also highlight that information systems and
data warehouses are more complex when dealing with pan-European infrastructure. The dissensus is
higher for all measures, except process performers, which highlights the heterogeneity among Euro-
pean actors. Following all the rest of the characteristics of the respondents presented in Figure 4, we
report disaggregated measures in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Despite slight variation depending on
the assessed aggregation, the table confirms robustness of the above discussed results in that the same
conclusions hold.
5. Conclusion
This paper has illustrated a process perspective to assessing macroprudential oversight in Europe.
As a sequence of activities with the ultimate aim of preventing and mitigating systemic risk, macropru-
dential oversight can be viewed as an inherently complex process, not the least the European System of
Financial Supervisors with its large number of actors at national and supranational level. To conceptu-
alize a process in this context, we introduced the notion of a public collaborative process (PCP). PCPs
involve multiple organizations with a common objective, where the dispersed organizations cooperate
under various unstructured forms and take a collaborative approach to reaching the final goal. In this
paper, we have argued that PCPs can and should be managed using the tools and practices common
for business processes.
At a more general level, the absence of well-functioning, transparent, and documented PCPs only
act to support populism and simplified solutions. If the problem is not known, solutions are hard to
find. As such, process readiness in the context of PCPs serves to enhance the political system, a well-
functioning democracy. The globally upcoming objective(s) of macroprudential oversight is neither a
simple task to tackle nor a dimension free of politics. As the European set-up is in the making, now is
the time to understand activities, define responsible entities and discern how the actors interact, which
we propose to be done through the lens of process management.
To analyze the macroprudential oversight process, we have conducted an assessment of process
readiness through interviews with actors in European macroprudential oversight. Based upon the
interviews, we provided an analysis model to assess the maturity of five process enablers for macro-
prudential oversight. Broadly, when measuring the level of and dissensus in process readiness of
macroprudential oversight in Europe, our analysis shows the following observations. To start with, we
observe that process design and metrics exhibit the lowest levels of readiness. For both, the level of
consensus is high. The enabler of process performers exhibits a relatively high level of readiness but
with some disagreement in comparison to design. Analytics to steer process metrics, as well as the
process infrastructure and the enabler of process ownership exhibits an average level of readiness, but
with larger dissensus. Beyond these numerical aggregates, we have also tapped into the richness of the
underlying interview data.
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Whereas the results of our analysis point to clear recommendations on the areas that need further
attention when macroprudential oversight is being developed, the above concluding summary provides
only a snapshot of the maturity of the process, which is likely to be somewhat outdated when this
paper goes to press. Hence, we would like to see that we have provided a general purpose framework
for assessing process readiness, rather than an ending point. The framework lends itself to regular
updates of the assessment of process readiness, enabling monitoring the impact of improvement efforts
over time. Likewise, this framework is far from bound to the region under analysis in this paper, not
the least to assessments of the state of macroprudential oversight in the US and UK.
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Appendix A. Questionnaire, scale and aggregations
Table A.1: The questionnaire and a mapping to process enablers.
 
Process enablers Subdimension Question
1. Process performers Knowledge & Skills How familiar are you with macroprudential oversight as a whole in Europe?
What is your role in macroprudential oversight?
Do you have contact points in all involved actors in macroprudential oversight?
Behavior Do you have a clear idea of how macroprudential oversight should be improved?
How much influence do you have on macroprudential oversight?
2. Process design Purpose & Context Is macroprudential oversight well-defined from start to end in terms of who is doing what?
How do you see your role in macroprudential oversight versus all other actors?
Are the correct actors involved and are roles divided correctly?
With whom do you exchange information and what kind of information?
Are there overall or particular problems with information flows?
Documentation Is your role in macroprudential oversight formally defined?
Is there a clear and accessible formal documentation of tasks?
How would you improve the documentation?
3. Process metrics Definition & Uses Is there a way to measure well-functioning macroprudential oversight (other than lack of crisis)?
How do we know that cost and benefit of macroprudential oversight is aligned (or optimal)?
If not, what should measures look like?
Analytics What is the role of analytical models and tools in macroprudential oversight?
Can systemic risk be measured? How do we know that risk is where we are measuring?
4. Process infrastructure Information Technology Do you have the tools and infrastructure needed to perform your duties in macroprudential oversight?
Do you have sufficient IT infrastructure for your work?
Do you have sufficient data infrastructure (data warehousing/sharing/quality)?
What improvements would be needed to support your tasks?
Human resources How flexible is your human resources infrastructure for supporting macroprudential oversight?
How would you improve training, development and hiring to support macropru?
5. Process owners Identity, Activities & Who is responsible for well-functioning macroprudential oversight?
Authority Who is responsible for developing macroprudential oversight?
Who has the ultimate authority to oversee all tasks and performers involved in macroprudential oversight?
Should anyone else be involved in developing and overseeing macroprudential oversight?
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Table A.2: Examples of our scoring and scaling.
 
Process enablers Subdimension Question Example answer Score Our comment
1. Process performers Knowledge & Skills How familiar are you with 
macroprudential oversight as a whole in 
Europe?
I'm pretty familiar with it
What is your role in macroprudential 
oversight?
Providing advice in the policy area, 
preparing recommendations, preparing 
guidance material.
Do you have contact points in all 
involved actors in macroprudential 
oversight?
Broad involvement [within my 
organization] - broad network, I can 
check who to contact, we have contact 
details
Behavior Do you have a clear idea of how 
macroprudential oversight should be 
improved?
"Problems related to a lack of top-down 
communication." "Don't they know what 
the want or don't they want us to know… 
?" "Is support from [management] 
missing?"
How much influence do you have on 
macroprudential oversight?
The interviewee has "signalled" about 
process problems - "but nothing has 
happened".
2. Process design Purpose & Context Is macroprudential oversight well-defined 
from start to end in terms of who is 
doing what?
"No, not yet." Tools are only being 
developed. Very few warnings issued, 
some recommendations. Little policy 
intervention so far.
How do you see your role in 
macroprudential oversight versus all 
other actors?
Our organization has the bigger picture, 
orchestrating. Political challenges in 
implementing country-specific 
recommendations.
Are the correct actors involved and are 
roles divided correctly?
Difficult to say… ESRB as a main actor, 
but ECB views that important issues 
should be discussed in the Financial 
Stability Committee. Actors not correct, 
until now. We don't know where things 
should be discussed.
With whom do you exchange information 
and what kind of information?
Statistics, we receive more information 
than we give.
Are there overall or particular problems 
with information flows?
No problems on expert level, problems 
on management level, between divisions. 
People protecting their data, information 
is power!
Documentation Is your role in macroprudential oversight 
formally defined?
The regulation of [the organization the 
person works in] clearly dictates this.
Is there a clear and accessible formal 
documentation of tasks?
Through discussions, there is potential 
to avoid overlaps.
How would you improve the 
documentation?
Perhaps some improvements are 
needed, there's ESRBs annual report 
but that's looking backwards. Perhaps a 
work program is needed.
3. Process metrics Definition & Uses Is there a way to measure well-
functioning macroprudential oversight 
(other than lack of crisis)?
"It is hard to do. I don't see enough 
agreement on objectives and measures."
How do we know that cost and benefit of 
macroprudential oversight is aligned (or 
optimal)?
"We don't."
If not, what should measures look like? "Hard to say."
Analytics What is the role of analytical models 
and tools in macroprudential oversight?
Highly relevant to use micro models to 
macro assessment, adapt them. Within 
the capabilities, but not yet there.
Can systemic risk be measured? How 
do we know that risk is where we are 
measuring?
Yes, not quantitatively as a single 
metric. Utilize a range of metrics, but 
have to be interpreted by humans 
(expert judgment). But, "where is 
accountability if very qualitative...?"
4. Process infrastructure Information Technology Do you have the tools and infrastructure 
needed to perform your duties in 
macroprudential oversight?
For macroprudential oversight, it is fine.
Do you have sufficient IT infrastructure 
for your work?
It is fine.
Do you have sufficient data infrastructure 
(data warehousing/sharing/quality)?
Common reporting framework is starting 
next year. More data is needed for more 
banks and this should be made 
completely comparable.
What improvements would be needed to 
support your tasks?
New data standards will help.
Human resources How flexible is your human resources 
infrastructure for supporting 
macroprudential oversight?
"We operate within the confines of public 
sector restrictions."
How would you improve training, 
development and hiring to support 
macropru?
"Yes, it's fine."
5. Process owners Identity, Activities & 
Authority
Who is responsible for well-functioning 
macroprudential oversight?
ESRB, the general board, also with the 
changes happening in November.
Who is responsible for developing 
macroprudential oversight?
ESRB, and in addition, the European 
Parliament and European commision.
Who has the ultimate authority to 
oversee all tasks and performers involved 
in macroprudential oversight?
European Parliament and European 
Commision. The power on national level 
is still with national authorities.
Should anyone else be involved in 
developing and overseeing 
macroprudential oversight?
These responses indicated clear opportunities for the use of analytical models. At 
the same time, the respondent was clearly worried (whether justified or not) with 
qualitative measures needed in conjunction with quantitative models. As such, we 
gave this answer a neutral score of 3.
These responses indicated clear challenges with regard to process metrics. The 
brevity of the responses also signal challenges in potential improvements. 
Accordingly, we gave this answer a score of 1.
This was one of the more positive answers with regard to available documentation. 
However, we do not view "regulations" as clear work descriptions, nor do we see that 
discussions should be needed (in case of clear documentation existing). Due to this, 
we gave this a neutral scoring of 3.
The answers given portray a rather bleak picture with regard to this person's opinion 
of the overall awareness of who is doing what in macroprudential oversight. Also 
indications of turf issues and political challenges. As a consequence, we scored the 
answer with a 1, indicating very poor readiness.
For these questions, we are specifically interested in whether the person has an 
interest in improving the process. In this case, there was a desire for improvement, 
but the interview also reflected a sense of cynisim - "but nothing has happened". The 
interviewee also pointed out that there are communication problems. All in all, we 
see that the respondent felt somewhat disempowered, despite a desire to improve 
things. As such, we gave the answer a neutral scoring of 3.
The wording used, "pretty familiar" could indicate a lower score than 5 (the 
maximum), but given the fact that this person is involved in building guidelines for 
macroprudential oversight, and also indicating that he/she has contact details for "a 
broad network", we opted for a scoring of 5. This scoring would indicate that the 
person is very well versed in macroprudential oversight.
4
4
4
This person had very clear answers with respect to process ownership, with some 
concerns regarding the role of national authorities. We gave the answer a score of 4 
based on the fact that the person in question named clear owners. However, we have 
not judged whether the answers are correct or incorrect, i.e., we are not assessing 
the suitability of ESRB, the Parlieament or Commision as process owners.
We interpreted the answers as things being relatively OK. At the same time, "the 
confines of public sector restrictions" leaves some room for improvement. 
Accordingly, we did not give this a perfect score.
Overall, these responses indicated no major problems, particularly with respect to IT 
infrastructure. Yet, the interviewee highlighted needed improvements related to data 
infrastructure, but indicated also planned future improvements in this direction. 
Hence, we gave the answer a score of 4.
5
3
1
3
1
3
Notes: The table shows for each process enabler and its subdimensions an example answer, scoring and a comment describing
the reasoning behind the score.
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Table A.3: Aggregated and disaggregated results with the analysis model.
 
Aggregations 1. Process performers 2. Process design 3. Process metrics 4. Process infrastructure 5. Process owners
L D L D L D L D L D L D L D L D L D
Total 4.04 0.93 3.57 0.99 1.74 0.62 2.05 0.79 1.48 0.67 3.05 0.79 3.09 0.85 3.14 1.08 3.22 0.95
National 3.69 1.03 3.54 0.88 1.77 0.60 1.77 0.60 1.46 0.66 3.08 0.79 3.31 0.75 3.08 0.95 3.31 1.03
European 4.50 0.53 3.60 1.17 1.70 0.67 2.44 0.88 1.50 0.71 3.00 0.82 2.80 0.92 3.22 1.30 3.10 0.88
Governing 4.42 0.79 3.92 0.67 1.83 0.72 2.08 0.67 1.50 0.67 3.09 0.83 3.33 0.65 3.33 0.89 3.42 1.00
Operative 3.69 0.85 3.23 1.09 1.62 0.51 2.08 0.90 1.38 0.65 2.92 0.76 2.92 0.95 2.92 1.24 3.00 0.91
Policymaker 4.29 0.73 3.57 1.22 1.86 0.53 2.00 0.91 1.71 0.73 3.15 0.90 3.07 0.73 3.15 1.14 3.50 0.76
Supervisor 3.67 1.12 3.56 0.53 1.56 0.73 2.11 0.60 1.11 0.33 2.89 0.60 3.11 1.05 3.11 1.05 2.78 1.09
Within central bank 4.18 0.88 3.59 1.12 1.88 0.60 2.00 0.89 1.59 0.71 3.13 0.81 3.12 0.70 3.19 1.05 3.41 0.94
Not within CB 3.67 1.03 3.50 0.55 1.33 0.52 2.17 0.41 1.17 0.41 2.83 0.75 3.00 1.26 3.00 1.26 2.67 0.82
Macropru mandate 4.06 0.90 3.53 1.01 1.82 0.64 2.13 0.81 1.53 0.62 3.12 0.78 3.12 0.70 3.19 1.17 3.41 0.87
Not macropru 4.00 1.10 3.67 1.03 1.50 0.55 1.83 0.75 1.33 0.82 2.80 0.84 3.00 1.26 3.00 0.89 2.67 1.03
Analytics IT HR A, A, AKnowledge/Skills Behavior Purpose/context Documentation Definition/Uses
Notes: The table reports the level of readiness (L) and dissensus (D) for each process enabler and its subdimensions for a
number of different aggregations. The aggregations follow the characteristics presented in Figure 4.
